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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics at  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance at  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed to  be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way t o  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to  pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
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active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This work is meant as an exploration of the origins and roles of different 
organizational routines which sustain diverse corporate structures and reproduce 
over time different "strategies" and performances. 
There is indeed quite robust evidence that firms -despite obvious regularities- 
persistently differ in their characteristics, behaviours and revealed performances. 
For example, they clearly differ in their sizes, their forms of internal organization, 
their degrees of vertical integration and intersectoral diversi.ficalion, etc. But they 
also differ in their revealed performances - in terms, e.g. of innovative success, 
speed of adoption of new technologies, inputs productivities and profitabilities -. 
Relatedly, a major puzzle concerns the reasons of persistence of these 
asymmetries. Why apparently "superior" organizational forms diffuse very slowly, if 
at all, within industries and, even more so, across national borders? 
A good part of the answer, in our view, certainly rests upon, the specificities of 
organizational competences. In fact, the first building block in our argument, 
directly developing on evolutionary theories, is that firms are crucial (although not 
exclusive) repositories of knowledge, to a large extent embodied in their 
operational routines, and modified through time by their "higher level" rules of 
behaviour and strategies (such as their "meta-rules" for innovative search, 
diversification, etc). In this view, competences are the collective property of the 
routines of an organization, and - due to their partial tacitness - are often hard to 
transfer or copy. Competence specificity leads straightforwardly to an easy 
possibility of "lock-in" and thus also to persistent diversi at firm-level and, 
'Y moreaver, to specificities at the level of 'na'l.ional trajectories' . 
In this work we shall focus primarely on the non-random distribution of 
competences across countries (and, relatedly, on the differences in the national 
patterns of organizational evolution). 
In order to interpret these international (or, also, inter-regional) differences, one 
must account, first, for the properties of the networks in which firms are 
embedded: these linkages with other firms - within and outside their primary 
sectors of activity -, and with other organizations (such as public agencies) shape 
and constrain the opportunities facing each firm to improve its problem-solving 
capabilities. Second, "national systems" of production and innovation entail also 
a broader notion of embeddedness of microeconomic behaviours into a set of 
social relal.ionships, rules and institutional constraints (Granovetter [I 9851). In turn, 
these embeddedness properties contribute to determine the evol~~tion of
organizational structures and, together, competences and strategies. 
Cf. Boyer [1992], Coriat [I994 b], Lazonick [1990] and [1993], Zysman [1994]. 
There are, however, two complementary aspects of this embeddedness 
argument (as well as to the earlier "lock-in" one). These two aspects also 
correspond to two perspectives on the nature and function of business firms 
.themselves. 
A first one - which has been highly emphasized in the evolutionary literature - 
concerns the coordination and problem-solving nature of organizational routines. 
Hence, their specificities are shown to be related to the "cognitive" features of 
the operational or search tasks at hand. 
Indeed, one of the author in earlier works has claimed that, in a first 
approximation, one could start with the assumption that a "weak incentive 
compatibility" among individual agents could be taken for granted, and directly 
analyze the collective problem-solving features of particular ensembles of routines 
composing the repertoire of each organization (Dosi and Marengo [19941)2. It is 
proving to be a fruitful investigative strategy. However, it neglects the second 
major role of organization and organizational routines, namely their being a locus 
of conflict, governance, and a way of codifying microeconomic incentives and 
constraints -as often emphazized by the other author (Coriat [1979-19941 and 
[I 990-1 9941. 
In this work we begin an exploration of this double - "cognitive" and 
"governance" - role of organizational routines. 
Just to mention few archetypical examples, the "Chandlerian" (primarely 
American) modern large corporation embodies the development of novel 
competences of managerial problem-solving, as recently Teece 119931 and 
Chandler [I 9921 himself have convincingly argued. At the same time, however, 
that organizational form embodies equally specific forms of internal governance 
of conflicts and incentives, which, in a shorthand, can be identified with 
"Taylorism" and "Fordism". 
Conversely, in an archetypical "Japanese" corporation (Aoki 119881 and [19901, 
Coriat [I991 b]), the patterns of competence accumulation are nested in quite 
different forms of governance and conflict management. Many other historical 
examples could be cited, from Germany to Italy to Britain ... 
Of course, governance mechanisms are today a quite familiar domain of 
economic analysis, but, most often, elegant equilibrium rationalizations have 
assumed away the crucial problem-solving tasks associated with the 
development of routinized, inertial and conflictual behaviours. Here, we take a 
rather different route, and move some steps toward an appreciation of the co- 
evolution of (highly imperfect) mechanisms of governance, on the one hand, and 
"what a firm is able to do and to discovet', on the other. 
That assumption is in the same spirit as Nelson and Winter [1992]. 
In this preliminary work, we aim to identify the properties, in both the 'cognitive' 
and 'governance' domains, of some distinctive set of routines - or grotocol~ - of 
different organizational forms, and suggest a co-evolutionary story on their origins. 
The embeddedness argument clearly comes out enhanced. Particular patterns of 
conflict, "truces" and mechanisms of incentive governance present an intrinsic 
collective nature, grol~nded in the institutions of each country. Together with the 
cumulative nature of learning processes, they contribute to explain the 
persistence of national specificities in organizational set-ups and corporate 
routines. 
II. SOME BACKGROUND FINDINGS AND HYPOTHESES ON LEARNING, 
CORPORATE ORGANIZATIONS AND GROWTH. 
Let us start by placing the discussion that follows concerning the relationships 
between processes of learning and mechanisms of organizational governance in 
the perspective of a broader set of questions and findings regarding the linkages 
between technological change, specificities in the institutional organization of 
economic activities and growth. 
A useful point of departure are a few findings that evol~~tionary-inclined 
practitioners in economics, but also many economists of other intellectual origins, 
economic historians and organizational theorists would consider robust stylized 
facts (although of course this is a theory-ridden and by no means uncontroversial 
evaluation). 
For our purposes, the preliminaries of our argument are a) even within commonly 
shared organizational patterns, the persistent heterogeneity across firms - an, 
even more so, across countries - in their abilities to develop, imitate, adopt 
technological innovations; b) roughly similar persistent differences across countries 
in their input productivities and incomes; c) the long-term correlation between 
the two sets of phenomena (which, indeed, a few economists would theoretically 
interpret in causal manners, in terms of co-evolutionary processes). 
Many more details on the evidence and the causality linkages have been 
discussed elsewhere (cf. Dosi, Pavitt and Soete [19901). For example. there is an 
emerging evolutionary view on the microeconomics of technological innovation, 
grounded in the specificities of the learning processes which characterize 
particular classes of problem-solving activities. In turn, this view naturally leads to 
predictions of inter-sectoral heterogeneity in innovative patterns, asymmetries in 3 innovative performance across firms, possible path-dependency and "lock-ins" . 
3 ~ i t h i n  a rapidly growing literature, see Freeman [1982], Nelson and Winter [1982], Pavitt [1984], Rosenberg [1985], 
Dosi [1988], Dosi et al. [1988], David [1985], Arthur [1988], Saviotti and Metcalfe [1992]. 
At a more aggregate level, a few scholars have attempted to show - both at 
theoretical and empirical levels - that growth can be viewed as a process fuelled 
by heterogeneous efforts of innovation checked by some market selection4. One 
is also able to show 'that these same processes in multi-economy settings may 
yield convergence but also (and more oft n) divergence, forging ahead and 
falling behind in relative per capita income'. Complementary empirical findings 
highlight the crucial importance of ethnological change as apparent b determinant of trade patterns and growth . 
As annoying as it might be for economists of other entrenched beliefs, here we 
shall take these phenomena for granted while investigating their microeconomic 
foundations and some implications for 'national trajectoriesu and possible lock-in 
phenomena. 
Indeed, a few implications are prima facie observationally undistinguishable from 
those derived from other modeling assumptions. For example, "new growth" and 
"evolutionary" theories at least in a first approximation overlap in their prediction 
of, first, innovation-driven self-sustained growt , and, second, long-term 9 differentiation in growth patterns across countries . Most likely, one encounters 
here a generic property of learning : techological learning, no matter how 
roughly represented, tends to imply the possibility of international differentiation, 
even when embedded into equilibrium dynamics and scarcity constraints on 
underlying endowments (eg. in the labour force, skills, capital, etc ... 1. It is, indeed, 
an important theoretical result, already implicit in the pioneering work of Arrow 
([I9741 on the peculiar nature of "information" - even when neglecting those 
differences between "information" and agent-specific "knowledge" emphasized 
by evolutionary theorists (Pavitt 119841, Winter [I9811 and [19871, Dosi and Egidi 
[19911). 8 As argued at greater length elsewhere , a distinctive feature of evolutionary 
models is the attempt to represent the possible emergence of relatively ordered 
and differentiated economic systems as self-organising processes floating in a 
world where "endowments" and "available technological blueprints" are seldom 
functionally binding constraints. Rather, technological learning within a notionally 
unlimited space of opportunities, at the levels of both individual firms and whole 
industries and countries, determines economic performances. "Endowments" are 
seldom binding because one can continuously improve their quality and 
4 ~ e e  the pioneering work of Nelson and Winter [1982], and, among others, Silverberg et al. [1988], Eliasson [1986], 
Chiaromonte, Dosi and Orsenigo[1993], Metcalfe and Gibbons [1986], Silverberg and Verspagen [1994]. 
'Dosi et al. [1994a]. 
k f .  Dosi, Pavitt and Soete [1990), Fagerberg [I9871 and [1988], Soete and Verspagen [1993], and the broad 
discussion in Abramovitz [I 9891. 
7 ~ f .  Romer [I 9861, [I 990a], [I 990b], Helpman and Krugman [I 9891, Grossman and Helpman [I 9911, Aghion and 
Howitt [I 9921. 
'Dosi and Orsenigo [I 9881, Dosi [I 9921. 
efficiency, while one can hardly separate the contribution of individual factors to 
growth, because of a rich structure of positive feedbacks. In this respect the 
evidence on the microeconomics of innovation (cf. Dosi [19881), shows a highly 
variegated patterns of search and development of new products and production 
processes, which nonetheless manifest a general inseparability between what 
firms do to allocate their resources to production and the processes through 
which they learn how to do better what they already do, or how to do new 
things. 
first, learning is to a good extent a sort of joint production with manufacturing 
activities themselves. Obviously, this includes phenomena of learning by doing, 
but it is also likely that search activities, such as R & D, will occur within firms and 
industries in fields related to what they are currently good at doing. Second, part 
of the technological knowledge is often tacit, specific to particular problem 
solving activities, somewhat idiosynchratic, embodied in people and 
organizations, cumulative in its developments. Third, there are sorts of general 
knowledge inputs (often related to "dominant" and pervasive technologies, such 
as mechanical engineering, electricity and more recently microelectronics) which 
enter most manufacturing activities, irrespectively of one country's specialisations, 
so that the rates at which these general competences grow influence the overall 
efficiency of each country. 
As a consequence. current allocative processes influence future opportunities of 
learning in ways that. to a good extent, are not and cannot be signalled and 
traded through the market. 
The coupled dynamics between learning and resource allocations may entail 
"virtuous circles" of sustained learning and efficient allocation of resources, or 
conversely, in "vicious circles", whereby, irrespective of the efficiency by which 
available resources are used, the system generates relatively low rates of 
innovation and, thus, also relatively low rates of increase in input efficiencies. This 
conjecture, already expressed in a quite confused fashion by some continental 
European writers on trade of the nineteenth century (eg. Ferrier, List, etc ... 1, is 
quite akin to the Kaldor-Myrdal idea of "circular causation". A contemporary, 
more rigorous formalisation is in terms of path-dependent processes wherein 
"localised" learning and dynamic increasing returns amplify microfluctuations and 
may "lock" the system-dynamics into trajectories that may well be "inferior" from 
a normative point of view, but still be stable over time (cf. Arthur [1988], Arthur, 
Ermoliev and Kaniovski [19871, David [I9751 and [19851). One can also intuitively 
see how international trade may reinforce polarisation among countries and lock- 
in into particular patterns of growth : competition on the world market and 
specialisation influence the rates and direction of innovative learning by firms and 
countries, which in turn affect international competitiveness and specialisation ... 
Both the evolutionary story and the "equilibrium story" on endogenous technical 
change, trade and growth, it has already been mentioned, easily generate 
international differentiation in income levels and rates of growth. In addition, in 
our view, the former is capable of generating a richer variety of dynamic patterns 
(albeit trading it off against lower formal elegance), and also mapping them into 
the underlying characteristics of technological learning (eg. i t s  features of 
cumulativeness, partial tacitness, appropriability, etc ... 1. However, this is not the 
issue we want to discuss here. Rather, let us consider the nature and importance 
of alternative microeconomic assumptions. 
As obvious, in the standard aggregate-production-function story on growth, 
organisational specificities of firms and countries are entirely absent. 'The most 
natural way of interpreting its microfoundations is in terms of an underlying 
General Equilibrium. In several of the "new trade" and "new growth" models 
there is indeed and explicit microfoundation, based on imperfectly competitive 
equilibria. However, precisely because of the equilibrium assumption, it is hard to 
account for any influence of particular forms of corporate and industrial 
organisation upon competitiveness and growth. Putting it another way, one 
senses a striking conflict between any equilibrium account of trade and growth 
and, say, Porter's analysis of the specific organisational and technological 
features underlying, for example, the Italian competitiveness in ceramic tiles or 
the British failures in mechanical engineering (cf. Porter [1990]), or, even more so, 
the stories that business economists usually tell about painstakingly discovered 
"superior" competitive strategies. 
Empirically, corporate organisations embody specific innovative search heuristics, 
modes of internal management, production rules, strategies for dealing with 
suppliers and customers (eg. vertical integration, arm-length relationships, 
collaborative agreements, reliance on the markets, etc ... 1, patterns of labour- 
relations, strategies toward multinational investment, etc ... but do these 
differences affect aggregate competitiveness and growth ? 
One hypothesis could be, of course, that the microeconomic links between 
organisational forms and competitiveness identified by business economists are 
local disequilibrium phenomena which cancel out in the aggregate. 
An alternative hypothesis to the same effect is to assume that, in general, 
organisational specificities are only epiphenomena without any long-lasting 
consequences on 
Indeed, the irrelevance of organisational forms can be argued from quite different theoretical points of view. 
Take, for example, an extreme version of a transaction-cost model of corporate organisation. The model would suggest 
that observed institutional set-ups (eg. within and between f m s )  are the organisational response to a requirement of 
efficient governance of exchanges. Hence, any observed international difference in the typical modes of organising 
transactions would be primarily attributed to lags and leads in diffusion of more efficient forms of organisation (if 
transaction costs do not dramatically differ across countries, which is likely to apply to developed economies, although 
it might not to comparisons among countries at different stages of development). In the long term, an extreme version of 
Conversely, we build here on the ideas that specific problem-solving 
competences deeply affect the ability of both individual firms and whole 
countries to generate and adopt new technologies and that these competences 
are not orthogonal to the forms of corporate organisation. Indeed, an emerging 
view on .firm-specific "dynamic capabilities" supports this view (cf. Teece et al. 
[I9921 and 19941). naturally overlapping with a much longer tradition of business 
studies pointing at the two-way causality between corporate stategies and 
structures, and their effects on performances. A locus classicus here is Chandler's 
interpretation of the emergence of the modern multidivisional corporation in the 
United States and the specificities of its development in other countries (Chandler 
[I9621 [I9901 and [19921). And, as forcefully emphasized by Teece 11 9931. a major 
distinguishing feature of the Chandlerian corporation rested in its ability to 
accumulate specific managerial competences in the domains of innovative 
search, production coordination and marketing. 
At a microeconomic level, all this implies also that given any set of technological 
competences and techniques of production which a firm can master, particular 
organizational structures and strategies affect both the actual efficiency that a 
firm displays and the rates and direction of accumulation of innovative 
knowledge (and, relatedly, the patterns of competitiveness over time). 
A growing empirical evidence corroborates this view. For example, Patel and 
Pavitt [1 9941 find that "a firm's existing product mix and associated competences 
strongly constrain the directions in which it seeks to exploit technological 
opportunities and acquire competences"; and that "... the firm's home country 
will influence its rate of technological accumulation" (p. 20) (See also Cantwell 
119891, Nelson [19941, Porter [19901). 
At an aggregate level, the argument implies that the international distribution of 
organisational structures and strategies is not random but reflects some country- 
specific characteristic which display persistence over time. In open economies, 
this means also that, given the patterns of technological and cost-related 
advantages/disadvantages of any one country, the degree to ich these 
advantages are exploited in terms of international competitivenesJb depends 
a transaction-cost theory of organisation would suggest that one should observe cotivergence in institutional set-ups, 
driven by the differential efficiency of various organisational modes. 
At the symmetric opposite, consider an extreme version of the Marglin-Piore-Sabel interpretation of industrial 
organisation (more faithful and sophisticated arguments along these lines are in Marglin [1974], Piore and Sabel [I9841 
(needless to say, we are pruposefully overemphasizing in order to clarify the point). Here, in a first approximation, the 
cross-sectional and intertemporal differences in the modes of organisation of firms and industries would be simply 
responses to power criteria, and reproduce with the inertia that institutions generally entail. The set of equally eficient 
organisational regimes, this interpretation would suggest, is wide, and the observed variety results from a selection 
within such a set, driven primarily by considerations of social control and income distribution. Hence, again, national 
specificities in corporate and industrial organisation would not be among the fundamental variables explaining "why 
levels and growth rates of income differ across countries". 
loon this notion of "competitiveness" cf. Dosi, Pavitt and Soete [1990]. 
also on the organisation forms and strategies of the domestic firms. Size, degrees 
of diversification and vertical integration, propensity to invest abroad, etc ... are 
obviously indicators, but at least equally important are the attitudes toward 
growth, profitability, market shares, uncertainty, innovation, the nature of internal 
hierarchies, the relationship between industry and finance, the ways conflict is 
managed, etc ... 
Finally, this implies that country-specific organisational characteristics may 
reproduce over time despite the selective pressures of international competition. 
The general interpretative perspective, as discussed in Dosi [19921, might be 
summarized in four general propositions. 
Proposition I: In contemporary economies, a good deal of knowledge about 
technology and exchange governance is embodied in organisations (primarily 
business firms), which reproduce and augment it via institutional ized procedures 
and "routinesf'that are only limitedly subject to strategic decision at each point in 
time. 
Another way of saying the same is that a lot of what is commonly considered as 
part of the "control variables" of corporate decision-makers is in fact part of the 
"state variables" of individual business units - possibly modifiable only in the long- 
term (more on this in Winter [19871). 
Proposition 2: Since the prevalent forms of market interaction are generally quite 
different from pure competition, agents plausibly engage in strategic behaviours. 
However, the environments are complex and non-stationary, so that the high- 
dimensionality of the state - and control - spaces renders strategic behaviour 
quite "opaque". The mapping between information, actions and outcomes is, at 
best, imprecise - often undertaken on the grounds of roughly calibrated heuristics 
and sheer untested beliefs. Hence, behavioural discretionality is very high. In 
general, neither "backward inductive" rationality nor environmental selective 
pressures and adaptive learning are able to render behaviours uniform. Putting it 
another way, neither learning nor selection are likely to induce anything 
resembling symmetric Nash equilibria, or, for that matter, equilibrium behaviour of 
any sort. 
Proposition 3: Technological and organisational learning within each firm is to a 
good extent local and path-dependent. Agents learn, building upon previous 
knowledge and are often also "blind" vis-a-vis other learning trajectories. They are 
rather good at solving particular classes of problems but not others, irrespectively 
of the conomic incentives that an ideal external analyst would be able to A identify . 
"~romising explorations of the idea are in Levinthal [1992], and Levinthal and March [1994]. See also Dosi and 
Lovallo [I 9941. 
The model of the firm telegraphically hinted here suggest that a firm is a 
behavioural entity (we borrow the definition from Kreps [I 9901) embodying highly 
idiosyncratic, specific and inertial compromises between different functions, 
namely (i) resource allocation ; (ii) information processing; (iii) incentives to 
individual performance ; (iv) control and power exercise ; (v) learning. 
Remarkably, most breeds of economic theories focus primarily upon one single 
function, often trying to "explain" it on the grounds of the usual maximisation cum 
equilibrium assumptions (for an impressionistic map, see Table 1). In the picture of 
the firm proposed here on the contrary, we broaden the analysis of its 
evolutionary features accounting also for fundamental trade-offs between the 
functions mentioned above. 
To illustrate them in a somewhat caricatural way, think of the possible trade-offs 
between performance control and learning. While the former is likely to imply rigid 
task specifical.ions, the latter generally involves a lot of experimentation, trial-and- 
error, "deviant" behaviours. (More on this below). In fact, it is easy to imagine a lot 
of different organisational arrangements on an ideal continuum between the 
Prussian army and a university department full of crazy scientists ... Indeed, some 
of these functional trade-offs are discusses at length in, for example, the 
microanalytic part of Nelson and Winter [19821, or, from a diverse angle, in the 
works of Simon, Cyert and March. Moreover, the organisational and 
management literature is rich with taxonomies describing the specificities of the 
sociological and "cultural" architecture of firms and the way they affect internal 
relations, behaviours toward the external environment and performances. 
TABLE 1: Representations of the firm in economic theories 
One of the points of this paper is precisely to expand on the notion of 
"competence" and suggest that it also involves specific patterns of governance 
of the functions hinted earlier. That is, competences do not only involve problem 
solving skills concerning the relalionship between the firm and the outside 
environment, but also skills and rules governing internal relationships. The two are 
not disjoint : the rates and direction of learning are shaped by the internal 
structure and the internal norms of behaviour of individual organisations. In this 
respect Aoki's suggestive comparison between two "ideal types" - the "Japanese 
firm" and the "American firm" - is a good case in point: different internal 
Functions 
Allocations of resources. 
- Information processing. 
Incentives to individual performc 
- Control and power exercise. 
Learning and problem-solving. 
'Theories 
Marshallian firms. 
Team theories, principalfagent, 
cooperative-games, transaction 
costs. 
"Radical" (anglosaxon) theories. 
Evolutionary theories. 
French Theories 
of 'Regulation' 
and 
'Conventions' 
governance structures affect learning and performance. even in the presence of 
identical economic opportunities (Aoki [1988]). 
More generally, this leads us to our last proposition. 
Proposition 4 : Firms are behavioural entities embodying specific and relatively 
inertial competences, decision rules and internal governance structures which, in 
the longer term, co-evolve with the environment in which they are embedded. 
The strengh of norms, routines, "corporate cultures" resides precisely in their 
persistence and reproduction over time. As sociologists and organisational 
theorists tell us, such an inertiality provides some degree of consistency among 
individual behaviours and motivations to action even if incentive compatibilities 
are much weaker than those prescribed by economic theory, and even if 
information about a changing and complex world border pure ignorance. But 
precisely that same inertiality makes organisational arrangements quite 
differentiated, and, often highly suboptimal in their ability to seize technological 
and market opportunities. (A more detailed discussion is in Dosi and Marengo 
11 9941 1. 
All four propositions, taken together, imply that, certainly, learning and 
environmental selection tend to reduce the variety of both technological and 
organisational innovations that continuously emerge. However, the "locality" of 
learning, the "opaqueness" of the environment and the positive feedbacks linking 
particular directions of technological learning with particular organisational set- 
ups all imply persistence of different forms of corporate and industrial 
organisation, even when ex-post they yield different competitive performances. In 
a jargon nearer to economists: as one can easily generate multiple equilibria 
stemming from non-convexities and increasing-returns in the technology space, 
so one can easily conjecture multiple "organisational trajectories" stemming, in a 
loose analogy, from organisational learning about norms, competences, 
corporate structures. 
Moreover, if these propositions are correct, one can identify a possible bridge 
between (evolutionary) modelling of growth and the rich and variegated 
account of the patterns of industrialisation and growth provided by historians and 
industrial sociologists alike. Just to give some hints. Ronald Dore's fascinating 
anatomy of the Japanese industrial system (Dore [19731), Albert Hirschman's 
analyses of the emergence and role of markets (Hirschman [I9771 and [I98211 a 
Lazonick's account of the relationship between industrial relations and patterns of 
industrial development (Lazonick [19921), all appear indeed compatible in 
principle with an evolutionary "explanation" of growth embedded in the 
dynamics of changing behavioural entities (firms, but also other social actors, for 
example banks, workers, public agencies. etc ...I and in a technol~~ical dynamics 
with path-dependent learning and widespread increasing returns . 
In this respect, we share Zysman's view that collective social entities - such as 
nations -, grounded in specific institutions and commonly shared norms of 
behaviour, shape the patterns of opportunities and constraints facing micro 
agents and, as a consequence. also the aggregate paths of economic change 
(Zysman [19941). 
However, while a lot of promising investigations have focused on technologies 
and firms as units of analysis, much less attention has been devoted so far in this 
perspective to the detailed anatomy of corporate organisations, the ways this 
links up with economy-wide institutions, and, ultimately their effect on economic 
performances. 
Ill. COMPETENCES AND FORMS OF ORGANISATIONAL GOVERNANCE : A 
PRELIMINARY LOOK INTO THE ORGANIZATIONAL BLACKBOX. 
As already mentioned, evolutionary economists and business analysts alike most 
often share the inclination to look at the repertoire of behavioural norms and 
practises - or routines - within each organization in order to identify "what a firm is 
good at", how it differs from other firms and also its proximate domains of future 
change. 
Indeed, there are good reasons for the widespre d presence of routinized 
behaviours which we do not need to repeat hereA : suffice to say that they 
appear to b robust forms of adaptive learning in complex and changing 
environmentse4. Moreover, as Nelson and Winter [I9821 thoroughly argue, the 
ensemble of organisational routines, to a large extent, stores and reproduce the 
problem-solving knowledge of the organisation itself. Together with the hypothesis 
on the widespread emergence of routinized behaviours, a common feature of 
most evolutionary analyses is the emphasis on their problem-solving properties. This 
is indeed a major distinguishing building-block of this perspective - and of the 
earlier pioneering contributions of Herbert Simon - as compared to more ortodox 
12,4nd, at a more aggregate level od description, this interpretation is highly complementary with a "Regulationist " 
view - in the French institutionalist sense of the patterns of "socio-economic tuning" characterising particular 
countries and phases of development (Boyer [I 988a] and [I 988b], Boyer and Coriat [1987]). 
13(cf. Nelson and Winter [1982], March [1994], Dosi and Egidi [1991], Dosi and Marengo [1994], Dosi et al. 119941, 
Cohen [1987]. 
14~li l ie  Nelson and Winter [1982], Dosi et al. [I9941 and Teece et al. [1994], we include under the broad heading of 
"routines", relatively invariant norms of behaviour which are contextdependent and approximately event- 
independent (in the sense that they are rather insensitive to the information on changes in the states of the world, 
given a particular contex?). Moreover, routines might be straightforwardly stationary rules (such as "...close the door 
of the factory every day at 7 p.m....") or higher level "dynamic rules" (such as "...search for new techniques in such 
and such directions..."; "...when something goes wrong do x and send a message to y..."; etc.). 
interpretations of organisational arrangements, primarely focused upon the 
relationships between distribution of information, incentives and resulting 
equilibrium outcomes. Putting it in a somewhat extremist way, "evolutionists" tend 
to assume that some, rather rough, incentive compatibility is sufficient to motivate 
individual efforts and then get down to the analysis of how the set of particular 
individual actions painstakingly combine in order to solve some equally specific 
problems, say, building cars and, moreover, doing it at competitive costs, search 
for better varieties of them, etc. Conversely, e.g. a "principalfagent" theorist 
would more easily assume that everyone is naturally able to build the "optimal" 
car - whatever that means - conditional on the available information, and then 
point at the details of sophisticated self-seeking interactions which could be 
undertaken by the members of the organisation on the grounds of asymmetric 
access to information. Elsewhere (Dosi and Marengo [19941), one argues at 
greater length that the former approach is indeed a much more promising first 
approximation to organisational behaviours. 
Relatedly, a growing effort has gone also into formal representations of processes 
of search, recombination, reinforcement of sequences of elementary operations 
yielding particular problem-solving procedures (see Marengo [19921). However, 
routines emerge and are implemented in organisations composed of a plurality of 
individuals who might have diverging interests. Certainly, a "firm can be 
understood in terms of hierarchy of practised organisational routines, which define 
lower order organisational skills and how these skills are coordinated, and higher 
order decision procedures for choosing what is to be done at lower level " 
(Nelson [1994], pp. 234-5). This hierarchy, however, also entails a mechanism of 
exercise of authority and governance of the admissable behaviours by which 
individual members can persue their interests. This is indeed acknowledged by 
Nelson and Winter 119821 who suggest that routines can be seen also as "truces" 
amongst potentially conflicting interests, but this complementary nature of 
routines has been so far relativ ly neglected in that literati- re which explicitly 
builds upon evolutionary ideas1'. The double nature of routines as problem 
solving skills and as mechanisms of governance appears with particularly clarrty 
when analysing the emergence and establishment new principles of 
management and work practises. 
Here, we shall consider two archetypical examples, namely "Taylorism" and 
"Fordism" on the one hand and "Ohnism" and "Toyotism", on the other. 
IV. TAYLORISM, "SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT" AND ROUTINES. 
Much has been written about Taylor's "Scientific Management" principles based 
on the systematic subdivision of organisational tasks and grounded in so called 
15~rnportant exceptions are Postrel and Rumelt [I 9921 and Kogut [1992]. 
"Time and Motion Studies" (Taylor [I907 - 19671 and [I97111 : however, except for 
the work of a few historians, largely unknown to economists, the implications of 
that approach to management has been largely underestimated in organisation 
theory, let alone economics. 
That underestimation appears also in the pioneering work of March and Simon 
[1993]. While they acknowledge Tayl r's as one of the classic contributions to 
organisational theory (and practice)lg they primarely emphasize, the "...the use 
of men as adjuncts of machines in the performance of routine productive 
tasks ... ", ... aimed to "...the goal (of using) the rather innef icient human organi v9' in the productive process in the best way possible" (March and Simon [I9931 . 
On the contrary, we shall argue that, first, Taylor had the pioneering 
understanding that questions of organisation of production are essentially 
questions of know-how and competence; and second, that the distribution of 
knowledge is intimately connected with the distribution of power. Third, the 
establishment of Tayloristic practices is a paradigmatic example of co-evolution 
between forms of incentive governance, routines, competences, under 
circumstances of acute interest conflict. 
In all this, it is certainly true that one of Taylor's major contributions to 
management practices have been Time and Motion Studies (TMS), but the latter 
have been the pre-condition of an epochal wave of codification of previously 
tacit knowledge of working operatives into a set of elementary procedures and 
acts. In turn, such a codification was a prerequisite for a changing control upon 
such knowledge itself, previously embodied in its "aggregate" form into the 
specific experience of skilled workers, whose abilities to bargain on e condition ?k of its use had been a major obstacle to productivity growth in the 19 century. 
Some historical examples and some references to Taylor's own analysis might help 
in illustrating these points. 
th At the beginning of the 20 century a prevalent for of production organisation 
was still the system of "inside contractors/helpers"'. Under that practise, the 
owner of a firm would entrust production to a set skilled workers, operating on its 
premises, who acted as "inside contractors", hiring in turn their own "helpers". The 
contractors directly supervised and rewarded the helpers, either with a fixed 
salary or in proporl.ion to their own gains. 
Under the system, the possibility of control of the owner upon the contractors 
were quite limited: only the latter knew the methods of production and times and 
rates of remuneration had to be painstakingly negotiated. Hiring directly the 
1 6 ~ h e  other being that by Guklick and Urwick, concerned with "the grand organisational problems of departmental 
division of work and coordination". 
17~ence  they characterize the approach as "physiological organisation theory", because it encompasses prirnarely 
physiological variables (p. 32) and add "Traditional Time and Motion Study Methods have avoided problem-solving 
tasks, and thus have not dealt with the aspects of human behaviour that will concern us throughout most of this 
volume" (p. 33) 
18cf. Montgomery [1979), Hounshell [1984], S. Meyer Ill [1982]. 
skilled workers as waged employees did not improve very much the outcome, 
since worker-specific, and tacit, knowledge allowed workers to master the pace 
of work. "Soldering" (nowdays one would say "shirking") was a normal pattern of 
be haviour: 
"Undeworking, that is deliberately working slowly so as to avoid doing a full 
day's work, "soldering" as it is called in this country, "hanging it out" as it is 
called in England, "ca canae" as it is called in Scotland is almost universal 
in industrial establishments and prevails to a large extent in the building 
trades; and ... this constitutes the greatest evil by which the working people 
of both England and America are now affected (Taylor [I 901 - 19671. p. 
1 3-1 4). And moreover, 
"So universal is soldering . . that hardly a competen t workman can be found 
in a large establishment, whether he works by the day or on piecework, 
contract work, or under any of the ordinary system, who does not devote a 
considerable part of his time to studying just how slow he can work and still 
convince his employer that he is going at a good pace" (ibid., p. 20). 
Taylor's description of the phenomenon in terms of "initiative and incentives" is 
surprisingly near the current parlance of principal/agent theorists, although he 
does not at all share with the latter the faith into the existence of some incentive- 
compatible equilibrium contract, irrespectively of the chosen reward system. The 
diagnosis is that 
" ... as the cause for soldering - the relations which exist between employers 
and employees under almost all systems of management which are in 
common use - it is impossible to make clear to one not familiar with this 
problem why it is the ignorance of employers as to the proper time in which 
work of various kind should be done - makes it the interest of the workman 
to 'soldier'"(Taylor 11 91 1 - 19671, p. 18). 
In turn this ignorance concerns the tacit knowledge associated with each 
19 trade . 
Incidentally note that -unlike most current representations of incentive 
compatibility issues-, one finds here an explicit em hasis on problem-solving 
knowledge as distinguished from sheer in for ma ti or?^, and also an implicR 
assumption that particular social groups (e.g. skilled workers), independently of 
the fine tuning of incentive mechanisms, share particular forms of collective 
behaviours (in this case, rendering de facto collusion easier). 
Rather than attempting to adjust the incentive structure, the general tayloristic 
programme involves a major ridefinition of the nature of productive knowledge 
and a novel distribution of it within the organization. Times and Motions Studies 
aim precisely at the control of the knowledge of working operatives themselves, 
lg"...The managers recognize frankly the fact that the 500 to 1000 workmen included in the twenty or thirty trades who 
are under them, possess this mass of traditional knowledge, a large part of which is not in the possession of the 
management". "...This mass of rules of thumb or traditional knowledge may be said to be the principle asset or 
possession of every tradesman" (Ibid. p. 32). 
"That distinction is of course a major building block of the analyses of production and innovation of Nelson and 
Winter [1982], Winter [1981], Dosi [1988], Pavittt [1984]. 
yielding the development of detailed operational protocols, that were to 
become the elementary production routines of modern corporations. 
This transformation required also a mqjor organizational transformation, namely 
the establishment of a specific corporate function, the Department of Planning - 
as repository of the general "production intelligence" of the factory. The 
Department analyzes the elementary tasks, allocates them to the individual 
workers and establishes the coordinating procedures. A major transfer of 
knowledge occurs, from individual workers to the management; a good deal of 
tacit knowledge is decomposed, codified and made easily transmissable via 
operational protocols. 
'The end result has been that the tasks of the Tayloristic organization, "first are 
repetitive ; second, these tasks do not require complex problem-solving activity 
by the workers who handle them" ... (Simon and March [1993], p. 32). But this is so 
precisely because the overall problem-solving and coordinating activity had 
been taken in charge by a specific managerial institution, the Dept. of Planning. 
Indeed, the story of "Scientific Management" - and, at its core. 'TMS procedures - 
is precisely the story of the transformation of individual skills into organizational 
competences codified into hierarchies of routines. 
This transformation, we suggest. had the same importance for the emergence of 
the modern (archetypically "American") corporation as the Chandlerian 
emergence of the managerial divisionalized organization. In fact, the two can be 
seen, to a large extent, as different levels of descriptions of the same major 
organizational innovation. The "Tayloristic revolution" describes at the level of 
production-routines a process which co-evolves with the reshaping of the 
organizational structure of the firm, entrusting the general knowledge on 
coordina n and strategies upon professional managers - as described by 27 Chandler . 
Further down, we shall also argue that the rates and modes of international 
adaptation of such "American" (Chandlerian and Tayloristic) corporation have 
deeply affected for a long period the growth patterns of each country. 
First, however, let us focus on the nature of the emerging Taylorist routines and 
their birthmarks stemming from the conflict that they triggered. 
At a social level, the introduction of Scientific Management has been 
accompanied by the open shop campaign, in the effort by the managers to hire 
non-unionized workers. Here is another element of the co-evolutionary dynamics 
between transformation of the knowledge bases and transformation of the 
collective institutions - in primis. the labour market -, in which firms are embedded. 
The organizational transfer of tasks from skilled workers to "specialized" ones has 
been painfully accompanied by the formation of new rules of hiring, firing and 
labour mobilrly which sustained the implementation of the new working 
procedures inside the organizations. 
- 
210n the importance of routines and competences underlying the Chandlerian corporation, see Chandler himself [I9921 
and Teece [1993]. 
Not surprisingly, the process was ridden with conflict. The case of the Watertown 
Arsenal (documented by the Aitken 119851) is only one of the many examples of 
the resistenc of the labour movement to the diffusion of Scientific h Management . 
Tayloristic routines as they finally emerged fully displayed their double nature as 
sets of problem-solving protocols and as devices of social control. TS M methods 
defined a new "economy of time" together with a new "economy of control". 
This implied also a new production paradigm whose implicit but fundamental 
assumption was that the productivity of any industrial unit is a positive direct 
function of the productivity of the individual worker considered at his workstation; 
and "productivity" itself is measured by the number of elementary units of work 
performed by the individual worker during a given unit of time (e.g. the hour or 
the working day). This production paradigm performed also for a long-time as a 
"focusing device" - in Nathan Rosenberg's terminology - shaping the direction of 
routine-improvement and competence accumulation. 
As argued at greater length elsewhere (Coriat [I9198 - 1994.1 [I9921 [I 993aI). this 
led to a very specific trajectory of production learning, whereby an increasing 
fragmentation of tasks proved to be conducive to efficient manufacturing of high 
volume, standardized, low-cost products but is likely to be less suitable to 
differentiated high-quality products. 
It is important to notice that this particular paradigm of organization of collective 
competence and of social control embodies also a specific mechanism of 
incentive governance. The approach Taylor suggested was two fold: on the one 
hand, he designed a new pay system (the so called "differential piece rate 
system"); on the other hand, incentives had to be matched by direct visual 
control upon workpractices by foremen. 
Patterns of problem-solving and patters of governance and control turned out to 
be intimately linked within a structure of organizational routines which constrained 
also the patterns of learning (the "trajectory" of technological and organizational 
change). 
In order to highlight the specificities of these routines and their internal consistency 
requirements between problem-solving and governance, let us compare 
"Taylorism" with another organizational archetype, namely "Ohnism" and 
"Toyotism" - as the new Japanese production practices are often called. 
22~aylor himself had also to justify his practices before a Special Conlmittee of the House of Representatives, cf. 
Taylor [l971]. 
V. "OHNISM" AND JAPANESE PRODUCTION ROUTINES. 
As it is handy to identify an archetype of labour management practices with 
Taylor's original vision and normative programme - notwithstanding the obvious 
nuances in the fulfillment of such a model -, so it is easy to point at T. Ohno as the 
general statement of an alternative set of 'Japanaese" production practices (cf. 
Ohno 119881). 
The two major specificities of "Ohnism" might be identified with a) "Just-in-time" 
organization of production flows and b) production routines based on the 
principle of "auto-activation" (More on this in Coriat [I 991 cd). Briefly, just-in-time 
coordination methods consist of producing only in the neighbourhood of what is 
actually sold, catering for orders in so far as they appear, r t er than producing 
and stocking on the grounds of expectations of future sale$! "Auto-activation" 
or "autonomation" (Jodoka) is a complementary organizing criterion for 
produclion tasks based on the idea that each worker has the time needed to 
complete his assignments and pass on a flawless product to his partner at the 
next stage of production. Moreover, "autonomation" entails the possibility - and, 
indeed the duty - to apply "local intelligence", identify anomalies, and, in case, 
stop the entire production flow. In turn, "autonomation" implies (i) a multiplicity of 
skills of each worker; (ii) some discrelionality and autonomy in decision-making; 
and (iii) patterns of coordination betwee roduction tasks smoothly flowing in 2' temporal sequences from inputs to outputs . 
A casual observer, and especially an economist, might consider all this as 
belonging to the domain of diverse and ephemeral managerial practices. On the 
contrary, one of us has argued elsewhere (Coriat [1991al) that these two basic 
principles of production entail organizational forms significantly different from the 
"Tayloristic" (or "American") archetype sketched above, and with that, also 
different patterns of organization of knowledge. 
The "seeding" of the evolulionary process which yielded these organizational 
outcomes, can be identified - as in the earlier Tayloristic example - into 
complementary problem-solving and incentive-compatibility dilemmas, most likely 
embedded in broader, more inertial institutions and cuttures. Japan, in its 
industrializing and reconstruction efforts, especially after WWII, was forced to find 
ways of achieving productivity gains other than classic "Fordist" methods based 
on the exploitation of economies of scale. To a good extent, it shared also the 
requirement, felt earlier so acutely by the Tayloristic philosophy, to place 
operatives' knowledge under management control (a lag most likely due also to 
the previous authoritarian regime which tended to surrogate for incentive- 
incompatibility with loyalty and force). In any case, the crux of the matter was, as 
in other modernizing countries, to reshape the distribution of knowledge away 
2 3 ~ h e  so-called Kanban approach, originally named after a procedure of dropping paper orders of components 
"upstream" the production chain, has been a well known implementation. 
2 4 ~ o t e  that this does not apply to "Taylorist"/"Fordist" patterns of organization of production whereby each elementary 
"shop" (e.g. "the drilling shop", "the boring shop", etc.) produces for a buffer stock of intermediate goods. 
,from variegated groups of highly skilled workers. And on the conflict-of-interest 
side, social polarization, in the decade following WWII, was certainly at a rather 
critical level. The course that labour relati s and working organization actually 98- took - by no means the only notional one was a specific and original way of 
work rationalization which did not stop to the Tayloristic breakdown of complex 
workers skills, but r composed the tasks for multi-functional workers, with flexible 
working standard b . A major consequence of this organizational innovation was 
that it implied a production engineering approach (concerning design and 
layout of production lines, programming principles, etc.) radically different from 
that which has revailed in America amid the numerous Ford-inspired 29 recommendations . 
For our purposes, we want to emphasize that the combination of just-in-time with 
"auto-activation" has given rise to a novel series of routines, both at the level of 
intra -and inter- organiza-lions prac'llces. 
A first crucial difference with the "American" theory and practice can be 
sketched as follows. Whereas the Taylorostic approach has been aimed to 
separate the functions of production, maintenance, quality control, planning, etc 
and to fragment the tasks required by each function, the Japanese way on the 
contrary has been to cre te workstations where the different tasks are to different 
degrees reaggregated8. Thus, one can observe that the fundamental 
2 5 ~ o  make a more general theoretical point: alike path-dependent models with multiple attainable limit states, 
conditional on the initial set-ups, we are far from claiming that the Japanese initial conditions telegraphically 
sketched here "determined" in any strong sense the observed outcome. Rather we just suggest that they contributed 
to select the feasible evolutionary path, together with broader social circumstances, analyzed from different 
perspectives by Aoki [1988], Dore [1973], Gerlach [1993], among others. 
2 6 ~ f .  Monden [1983]. The linearization of the production processes hinted above is associated with these more flexible 
production standards and also pernlits to switch froin some predetermined production time to a "sliared" time: cf. 
Monden [I9831 and Coriat [I 9911. 
27~roadening the field of observation from the shop floor level to the enterprise as a whole, the same principle of 
relative de-specialisation can be observed, particularly with the establishment of horizontal lines of c o ~ u n i ~ a t i o n s  
between marketing, R & D and manufacturing . These flexible interdepartmental communications make it possible 
to get closer to the market as regards quality trends and at the same time to reduce lead times (Cf. Clark & Fujimoto 
[I 9891, for example). 
28~n  more detail, this process of de-specialisation and re-aggregation of tasks affects four domains. 
- The first of these re-aggregations concerns the reassociation of tasks within direct manlrfbcturing itself : 
"versatility" and multi-specialisation are the norm and stand in opposition to the principles of 
compartmentalisation and repetitivity featured by American Tayloristic patterns. 
- The second consists of the re-acquisition by direct operatives of die tasks of diagnostics, repair and light 
maintenance ; self-management and self-inspection make sense and prove effective only if the front-line 
operatives are also in charge of the routine maintenance of the plant and machinery. 
- The third is the reintroduction of qualily control at the working stations. Here again, the be-all and end-all of 
the principle of self-management and self-inspection is to tackle product quality at the workstations 
themselves. 
- Lastly, there is also a re-aggregation of programmit~g and nlanufacturing tasks, which constitutes the 
necessary condition of the Kan-ban method (Coriat [199a] and [1992]). 
significance of the Japanese approach consists of a reconstitution at shop floor 
level of something like a general and re-aggregated function of manufacturing, 
the main characteristic of which is that it puts together again tasks wh' h Taylor's 
approach recommended be carefully and systematically kept apart'. On this 
basis, one observes the introduction of specific protocols entailing permanent 
manipulation of "Kan-Ban" and used either to command or to deliver "just-in- 
time" the internal flows of semifinished products. 
One can wonder how it is possible to re-aggregate general functions in 
manufacturing without losing control on productivity : i.e. can the taylorian 
legacy be so deeply abandoned ? 
The answer to this question (crucial for the understanding of the "control" 
dimension of the Japanese routines) is two fold. 
First, IMS is not at all abandonned. As it has been pointed out by a very attentive 
and pertinent commentator, TMS has been "regained" (see Adler [I99311 : i.e. the 
idea of fragmenting tasks is maintained but, the jobs are now broken into basic 
"transferable work components". Such a component is defined as the "smallest 
practical combination of acts that can be transferred from one worker to 
another". 'Thus flexible work standards and re-aggregation of elementary tasks 
are made compatible with t objective of maintaining workers knowledge and 
work standards under contro$8. Second, the Japanese methods embed specific 
practices of controling workers tasks and activities, one of the most important 
being what is termed "management by eyes", elaborated and designed by T. 
Ohno himself. 'This principle is indeed very simple and consists in organizing the 
workshops, and the work on the lines, in such a way that everything can be very 
easily (physically) visible. For example, any worker have the right (and in fact 
more than the right : the duty) to stop the line any time he thinks it necessary to 
guarantee the quality of his performance ; at the same time, each stop is 
signaled by a red light appearing on an electronic pannel hanging above the 
line (It is the so called 'andon" system). 
More generally, Ohno explains the principle of "managing by eyes" as follows : 
..." In order to allow "autoactivation" to detect anomalies, one needs that 
any-thing "abnormal" appear immediately at the naked eye. The principle 
ought to apply to quality (every faulted product should immediately 
surface) as well as to the quantity (progress of work vis-d-vis previous plans 
should be effortlessly measured on the very workplace). This should not only 
apply to the machines but also to the methods of production, the 
circulation of Kanbans, the levels of stocks, etc" (Ohno [I 9881). 
29~n its spirit and in its practical details, the method appears as the implementation of principles of de-specialisation, 
not only in terms of the employee's work, but in a more global perspective as a de-specialisation of the "general 
work of the enterprise", re-aggregating on the shop floor the tasks (production, programming or quality control, etc.) 
systematically kept apart by Taylorism. 
3 0 ~ o r  a number of vexy convincing illustrations of this kind of practices in Japanese transplants in the US see Parker 
and Slaughter [1988]. 
Note again also the learning side of this set of routines u s  well as those associated 
with just-in-time : far from being sheer devices to minimize yields of faulty pieces of 
output or minimize inventories, they fulfill primarily the task of immediately 
highlighting the presence of a problem and allowing or forcing operatives to 
handle it. 
VI. MICROROU'I'INES, INCENTIVES AND INSTITU'TIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS. 
More geneerally, a crucial implication of each distinct pattern of organization of 
production is that it involves a specific set of problem-solving routines and equally 
specific, and broadly consistent, forms of incentive governance and control. In a 
telegraphic summary, Taylorism introduces also a new reward mechanism based 
on a piece wage system, made of a fixed part -corresponding to a minimum 
number of pieces per day -and a variable part- triggered by above minimum 
output and pushing upward the whole per-piece wage rates (also on the part 
below the minimum threshold)31. 
"fordism" further modifies the reward mechanism, introducing the famous 'five 
dollar day' wage (well above the current wage at the time), but, together, 
eliminates workers' discretionality in the choice of working pace by incorporating 
it into the predetermined speed of conveyors along the assembly line. Finally, it 
introduces systematic screaning and testing of workers themselves, in terms of 
their social attitudes, their loyalty and obedience. This task is delegated to a 
special institution : the so called "Sociological Department' 32. 
Conversaly, '0hnisme"implies a complex reward structure involving, a) a base 
salary ; b) individual bonuses ; and c) collective performance bonuses. 
As M. Aoki has forcefully shown in several occasions, the two stylized and 
archetypical organizational forms, called the "American" and the "Japanese" 
entreprises, differing in the internal architecture with respect to both information 
processing and incen i e-governance, are likely to yield also systematically 
different performance>'. Our argument strengthens indeed the point. The set of 
"Japanese" (or "Ohnist") produc-lion routines does not only embody different 
channels of information processing but also distribute knowledge within the 
organization in ways remarkably different from the 
"Tayloristic"/"Chandlerian"entreprise. And at the same time, on the governance 
side, individual incentives to efficiently perform and learn are sustained by 
31  So for example, suppose that the minimum output is 200 pieces per day corresponding to 2 $ wages (i.e. 1 cent per 
piece) : output up to 10 % higher would entail, says, a 10 % upward adjustment of the whole wage ; a 20 % higher 
output a wage 40 % higher, etc. Incidentally, note that the principle appears in violation of "marginal productivity" 
criteria but seems more akin a modified version of an "efficiency wage" principle. 
32 The "Sociological Department" goes as far as checking on the workers'families, their social habits, etc ... On the story 
on the Five Dollar Day and the role attributed to the "sociological department" see : S.Meyer m [I9921 
3 3 ~ o k i  [1988] and [1990], 
company-specific rank - hierarchies, delinked from functional assignments (Aoki 
[19901). 
The collective "embeddedness" dimension is equally important. We mentioned 
earlier that the establishment of "Tayloristic" organizational routines co-evolved 
with the development of what one could shorthandedly call the "American 
labour market". Symmetrically, radically different institutional norms (such as life- 
time employment, etc.) became established with respect to large Japanese 
corporations. Yet at another level, different corporate strategies (with respect to 
investment growth, diversification, R & D, etc.) appear to taxonomica I match Jx specific institutional relationships between financial and industrial actors . 
At a much finer level of detail, these modal patterns of relationship between 
diverse economic agents, again, are entangled into identifiable sets of 
behavioural routines. For example in Coriat [1994], one tries to identify typical 
protocols of inter-firm transactions, conditional on the internal modes of 
governance and problem-solving. 
A revealing illustration is the relationship between "core" companies and their 
suppliers. Under the Japanese system of organizational routines, Asanuma (119871 
and [I98911 sharply illustrates the protocols for information-flows, 
compel.ition/cooperal.ion, "relational rent-sharing" - as Aoki 119881 would phrase 
it. Among these specific set of routines, those concerning quality selection are 
clearly of crucial importance. Producing almost without inventories (of either 
inputs or outputs) implies that product q~~ality of the semi-finished pr0dlJcts either 
ordered or received by core companies must be very high. As a consequence, 
the process of selection of subcontractors implies very detailed pr ocols (in the 95 case of the French auto industry they are discussed in Coriat [I99411 . 
Similar exercises could fruitfully be done (and, indeed, ought to) with respect to 
other types of interactive procedures (e.g. with respect to the labour market, 
financial investors, etc.) Just to mention an example, it seems to us that Lorenz' 
argument on the importance of trust (or rather the lack of it) in British production 
practices belong precisely to this domain of analysis: the "truces" that emerged 
codified in particular set of routines tended to foster conservatism, and hinder the 
diffusion of technological and organizational innovation (Lorenz [19941). In any 
case, for the little we know about the behaviours of entreprises with respect to 
their external environment, the evidence seems to corroborate our conjectures, 
(i) that somewhat typical and rather inertial behavioural patterns tend to emerge, 
(ii) that these patterns can be roughly mapped into distinctive internal hierarchies 
of routines within the organization ; (iii) that broader collective institutions - e.g. on 
3 4 ~ o r  example, "market-based" and "bank-based forms of finance of investment and inter-firm selection: cf. Zysman 
[1994], Aoki [I988 1, Dosi [1990]. A tentative combinatorial exercise among the viable forms of governance among 
internal routines, labour market interactions, modes of finance and innovative strategies is presented in Aoki and 
Dosi (1992). 
35~riefly, they typically show a five-stages procedure of selection and relationship construction, going from the 
"assessment of quality aptitude"; to tentative efforts of knowledge transfer to the contractors, evaluation of the 
preliminary outcomes; acceptance into the core company "product quality assurance circle"; and, finally, permanent 
"real time" assessment of deliveries. 
the labour or financial markets - constrain and shape the sustainable routines ; 
and (iv) that also in the relationships amongst legally independent actors, 
interactive routines fold togeth r problem-solving complementarities and 5k asymmetric mechanisms of control . 
'Taylorism', the Chandlerian M-form organization, 'Fordism' or for that matter, 
'Ohnism' and 'Toyotism' represent major organizational innovations, with -in 
principle- a universal character. And, indeed, at least the former three diffused 
internationally, well beyond the countries where they were originally introduced, 
spurring deep modifications in industrial structures and shaping long-term 
productivity growth (on 'Taylorism' and the M-form, see Kogut 119921 and 
Chandler [1990]). It is possibly too early to evaluate the international diffusion of 
Japanese practices, but a rich case-study evidence already suggests their 
widespread impact (see S. Wood [I99311 
However, the rates and patterns of diffusion of all these major organizational 
paradigms have been shaped by the institutional context of each country, which 
implied also some inevitable 'hybridization'. This, in some cases, yielded also major 
modifications further down the road. In this respect, Japanese practices may 
indeed be considered as a profo~~nd organizational innovation originally 
grounded in the local adaptation of Taylorism and Fordism, which eventually led 
to a distinct archetype of organizational routines for problem-solving and 
governance of industrial relations. 
One can see here a good example of the notions of embeddedness, (limited) 
lock-in, and potential invadability. Embeddedness implies that earlier patterns of 
industrial organization, labour practices, etc. carry their influence over the ways 
new forms are introduced : it applies to the original adaptations of Taylorism and 
Fordism to Japan or Sweden, as well as to that of the M-form corporation in e.g. 
the UK, Germany or Japan. Lock-in entails the prediction of progressive 
dominance of some specific patterns of governance and problem-solving and 
their rather inertial reproduction over time. However, each 'national system' 
remains potentially 'invadable"-to use the jargon of current evolutionary games- : 
it might be unable to generate internally radically new organizational 
experiments, but is not immune to the progressive adoption of organizational 
innovations developed elsewhere. 
3 6 ~ o r  example, with respect to this latter point, in Coriat [1994] we argue that networking routines, while being 
certainly a mechanism of collective learning generally imply also persistent asymmetries and inter-firm hierarchies. 
The embeddedness argument is formulated, in quite general terms in Granovetter [1985], and more specifically with 
regards to corporate strategies of production and innovation, in Lazonick [I9901 and [1993], Soskice [I9931 and 
Zysman [1994]. See also Boyer [1988a] and Dosi, Pavitt and Soete [1990]. 
VII. FROM CORPORATE ROUTINES TO PAllERNS OF DEVELOPMENT : PREI-IMINARY 
CONCLUSIONS AND MANY RESEARCH ITEMS ON LEARNING, INCENTIVES AND 
PAllERNS OF CHANGE. 
We began this work by presenting what we consider to be a few "stylized facts" 
on the relationship between technical change and growth, together with some 
microeconomic evidence on innovative activities. In turn, many of these "facts" 
entail challanging puzzles for the theory. Old ones like "why levels and grow-th 
rates of income differ " demand - it is increasingly acknowledged - to dissect the 
blackbox of technological change, as Nathan Rosenberg urged us quite a while 
ago. Investigations in this perspective have recently increased momentum and, in 
our view, are significantly adding novel insights into the processes by which 
knowledge is augmented, to a good extent also as a result of exploratory 
endeavours of profit-motivated agents, together with those of other institutions. 
While one progresses in opening up the "technological blackbox", however, there 
is yet another blackbox - the organizational one - whose anatomy is plausibly 
quite important also for every macro economist who does not consider the 
specificities of corporate organizations simply as veil covering deeper and 
invariant economic mechanisms. 
'The proposition that organizational structures matter in terms of performances, in 
fact, can be quite easily supported even in term of otherwise quite ortodox 
theories, whenever one abandons the most restrictive assumptions on perfect 
information, complete markets, etc. (see, within an enormous literature, Aoki 
[19901, Sah and Stiglitz [19851, Radner [19921). Even more so, if one accounts for 
the endemic occurrance of transaction costs as Oliver Williamson ([I9851 and 
[I 9851) emphasizes. 
Of course, the learning dimension that evolutionary and organizational 
economists add to the picture further reinforces the point. The path-dependent, 
often organization - embodied, nature of knowledge make corporate structures 
the prime carriers of diverse problem-solving skills, to a good extent stored and 
reproduced via organizational routines 
However, routines do not only represent problem-solving procedures but are at 
the same time control and governance devices. In this work we have analyzed 
precisely this double nature of theirs. Moreover, we have argued, specific set of 
routines often bear the mark of the conflicts which accompanied their 
emergence and establishment. 
The two archetypical sets of routines which we have outlined in this work namely 
"Tayloristic" and "Ohnistic" (i.e. loosely speaking "Japanese") production 
methods vividly illustrate these points. More precisely, we have tried to show that 
the explanation of particular sets of ro~~tines can be traced back to the 
coevolution between corporate patterns of knowledge distribution and 
mechanisms of coordination and governance. 
All this, most likely, reinforces phenomena of path-dependence and international 
differentiation. generally sustained by mutually shared conventions, norms and 
implicit or legally enforced institutions. 
There are seveeral rather general implications of the perspective outlined in this 
work, which can only be sketched out in this paper. 
As we have emphasized above, the multiple facets of organizational 
arrangements and the forms of their institutional embeddedness are, in our view, 
an integral part of the explanation of the diversity of development patterns that 
one observes : in fact, we suggest they are among the core elements of those 
diverses 'social capabilities' identified by Abramovitz 119891 as 'deeper causes' of 
contemporary growth. 
Other -more theoretical implications- have only been briefly limited. For example, 
the foregoing interpretation of the nature of organizational routines encompasses 
the tasks of incentive governance analyzed by e.g. principal agent models. But it 
radically depart from the latter taht it consider 'what the agents believe to be 
their interests', the ways they pursue them and the knowledge that they possess 
to be the evolutionary outcome of search, conflict and mutual adjustement 
sanctioned thereafter by rather inertial rules and organizational structures. 
Corrolaries of this view are also the predictions that a) might be generally 
unisleading to reduce whatever pattern of intra -or inter- organizational relations 
to a set of 'contracts" (whether optimal or not) ; b) given the organizational 
routines, individual performances are likely to be rather insensitive to any fine 
turning of incentives ; and c) path-dependency phenomena will tend frequently 
to carry over the reproduction of particular organizational arrangements well 
beyond the time of their possible usefulness. 
Other implications -nearer the concerns of the economics of innovation- regard 
the effect of established set of routines upon the 'trajectories' of technical 
progress (and here is also where the economics of innovation can meet analyses 
from other disciplinary camps which have emphazized the aspects of 'social 
construction"of tchnical change...). 
Indeed, we see ahead a promising research agenda. 
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